A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Mathematical Economics.
Volume (Year): 22 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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- Matt Van Essen, 2012. "Information complexity, punishment, and stability in two Nash efficient Lindahl mechanisms," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 15-40, March.
- Van Essen, Matthew & Lazzati, Natalia & Walker, Mark, 2012. "Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 366-381.
- Charles Figuières & Marc Willinger, 2012. "Regulating ambient pollution when social costs are unknown," Working Papers 12-17, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Jun 2012.
- Healy, Paul J. & Mathevet, Laurent, 2012. "Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
- Van Essen, Matthew J., 2008. "A Simple Supermodular Mechanism that Implements Lindahl Allocations," MPRA Paper 12781, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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