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The governance of industry rules and energy system innovation: The case of codes in Great Britain

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  • Lockwood, Matthew
  • Mitchell, Catherine
  • Hoggett, Richard
  • Kuzemko, Caroline

Abstract

•Detailed energy industry rules are crucial to realising policy goals, but typically overlooked.•Governance arrangements determine ease of rule change for policy goals.•Delegation is a widespread institutional design principle but has risks of capture and inertia.•The case of code governance in Britain gives a demonstration of these risks.•A reform agenda is outlined and wider lessons drawn out.

Suggested Citation

  • Lockwood, Matthew & Mitchell, Catherine & Hoggett, Richard & Kuzemko, Caroline, 2017. "The governance of industry rules and energy system innovation: The case of codes in Great Britain," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 41-49.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:47:y:2017:i:c:p:41-49
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2017.06.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Catherine Mitchell, 2016. "Momentum is increasing towards a flexible electricity system based on renewables," Nature Energy, Nature, vol. 1(2), pages 1-6, February.
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    4. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Martimort, David, 2003. "Regulatory Inertia," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 413-437, Autumn.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoicka, Christina E. & Lowitzsch, Jens & Brisbois, Marie Claire & Kumar, Ankit & Ramirez Camargo, Luis, 2021. "Implementing a just renewable energy transition: Policy advice for transposing the new European rules for renewable energy communities," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).

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