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Negotiation analysis using the theory of moves—Theoretical background and a case study

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  • Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa

Abstract

A branch of game theory—the Theory of Moves (TOM) proposed by Brams (1994a, Theory of moves. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge), is used to model the negotiations on agriculture during the Uruguay Negotiation Round of World Trade Organization (WTO). The paper presents general principles underlying the TOM and demonstrates that it is well suited to describe the negotiation process. Moreover, the results of the TOM game prove that the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (CAP) was shaped by the international negotiations on agriculture during the Uruguay Round of WTO.

Suggested Citation

  • Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa, 2016. "Negotiation analysis using the theory of moves—Theoretical background and a case study," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 44-53.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:38:y:2016:i:1:p:44-53
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2015.10.002
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    1. Brams Steven J., 1994. "Game Theory and Literature," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 32-54, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska & Agnieszka Baer-Nawrocka, 2021. "Regional Differences in Benefits from the EU Common Agricultural Policy in Poland and Their Policy Implications," Agriculture, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-14, March.
    2. Ewa Kiryluk-Dryjska & Agnieszka Baer-Nawrocka & Obinna Okereke, 2022. "The Environmental and Climatic CAP Measures in Poland vs. Farmers’ Expectations—Regional Analysis," Energies, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-13, June.
    3. Kiryluk-Dryjska, Ewa & Baer-Nawrocka, Agnieszka, 2019. "Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU: Expected results and their social acceptance," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 607-622.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Uruguay Negotiation Round of WTO; Agriculture; Theory of moves;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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