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Fairness models for multi-agent kidney exchange programmes

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  • Klimentova, Xenia
  • Viana, Ana
  • Pedroso, João Pedro
  • Santos, Nicolau

Abstract

Nowadays there are several countries running independent kidney exchange programmes (KEPs). These programmes allow a patient with kidney failure, having a willing healthy but incompatible donor, to receive a transplant from a similar pair where the donor is compatible with him. Since in general larger patient-donor pools allow for more patients to be matched, this prompts independent programmes (agents) to merge their pools and collaborate in order to increase the overall number of transplants. Such collaboration does however raise a problem: how to assign transplants to agents so that there is a balance between the contribution each agent brings to the merged pool and the benefit it gets from the collaboration.

Suggested Citation

  • Klimentova, Xenia & Viana, Ana & Pedroso, João Pedro & Santos, Nicolau, 2021. "Fairness models for multi-agent kidney exchange programmes," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jomega:v:102:y:2021:i:c:s0305048320306873
    DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2020.102333
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Klimentova, Xenia & Biró, Péter & Viana, Ana & Costa, Virginia & Pedroso, João Pedro, 2023. "Novel integer programming models for the stable kidney exchange problem," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 307(3), pages 1391-1407.

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