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Relationships among budgetary leadership behavior, managerial budgeting games, and budgetary attitudes: Evidence from Taiwanese corporations

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  • Huang, Cheng-Li
  • Chen, Mien-Ling

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the relationship among leadership behavior (contingent reward vs. contingent punishment), managerial budgeting games (devious games vs. economic games), and attitudes towards the budgetary process. Relationships were tested using a structural equation model that was estimated on the basis of questionnaire data from 216 Taiwanese managers. The majority of respondents were accounting/finance managers employed by manufacturing firms. Results reveal that contingent-reward leadership behavior has a direct and positive effect on attitudes toward the budgetary process, and an indirect effect through economic games. On the other hand, we find evidence that contingent-punishment leadership behavior has only an indirect and negative effect on attitudes toward the budgetary process through devious games, especially for non-accounting/finance managers. Managers who play economic games tend to have positive attitudes towards the budgetary process, while those who play devious games do not. The findings should be useful to management in understanding what effective leadership behavior is in the budget-preparation process in Taiwan, and assessing how budgeting games are likely to be adopted by Taiwanese managers.

Suggested Citation

  • Huang, Cheng-Li & Chen, Mien-Ling, 2009. "Relationships among budgetary leadership behavior, managerial budgeting games, and budgetary attitudes: Evidence from Taiwanese corporations," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 73-84.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jiaata:v:18:y:2009:i:1:p:73-84
    DOI: 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2008.12.007
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    2. Dykxhoorn, Hans J. & Sinning, Kathleen E., 2010. "A review and analysis of international accounting research in JIAAT: 2002–2010," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 137-153.

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