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Convertible Debt as Delayed Equity: Forced versus Voluntary Conversion and the Information Role of Call Policy

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  • Nyborg Kjell G.

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  • Nyborg Kjell G., 1995. "Convertible Debt as Delayed Equity: Forced versus Voluntary Conversion and the Information Role of Call Policy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 358-395, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jfinin:v:4:y:1995:i:4:p:358-395
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    Cited by:

    1. Finnerty, John D., 2015. "Valuing convertible bonds and the option to exchange bonds for stock," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 91-115.
    2. Isagawa, Nobuyuki, 2000. "Convertible debt: an effective financial instrument to control managerial opportunism," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 15-26.
    3. Aron A. Gottesman, 2004. "The Strategic use of Convertible Debt in “Deep Pocket†Predatory Games," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 48(1), pages 50-60, March.
    4. Dutordoir, Marie & Lewis, Craig & Seward, James & Veld, Chris, 2014. "What we do and do not know about convertible bond financing," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 3-20.
    5. Christian Dorion & Pascal François & Gunnar Grass & Alexandre Jeanneret, 2014. "Convertible Debt and Shareholder Incentives," Cahiers de recherche 1403, CIRPEE.
    6. Thomas J. Chemmanur & Karen Simonyan, 2010. "What Drives the Issuance of Putable Convertibles: Risk‐Shifting, Asymmetric Information, or Taxes?," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 1027-1068, September.
    7. Rastad, Mahdi, 2016. "Capital structure pre-balancing: Evidence from convertible bonds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 43-65.
    8. Dorion, Christian & François, Pascal & Grass, Gunnar & Jeanneret, Alexandre, 2014. "Convertible debt and shareholder incentives," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 38-56.
    9. M. Dutordoir & L. Van De Gucht, 2004. "Are European Convertibles More Debt-Like than the US Issues? An Empirical Analysis," Review of Business and Economic Literature, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Review of Business and Economic Literature, vol. 0(4), pages 533-568.
    10. Koziol, Christian & Lawrenz, Jochen, 2012. "Contingent convertibles. Solving or seeding the next banking crisis?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 90-104.
    11. Correia, Maria do Rosário, 2008. "The choice of maturity and additional covenants in debt contracts: A panel data approach," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 284-300, September.
    12. Maria do Rosario Correia & Scott C. Linn & Andrew Marshall, 2004. "An Empirical Investigation of Debt Contract Design: The Determinants of the Choice of Debt Terms in Eurobond Issues," FEP Working Papers 148, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    13. Fernando Díaz & Rodolfo Martell & Gabriel Ramírez, 2011. "Agency Effects in the Convertible Debt Puzzle: An Empirical Investigation," Working Papers 26, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    14. Grundy, Bruce D. & Veld, Chris & Verwijmeren, Patrick & Zabolotnyuk, Yuriy, 2014. "Why are conversion-forcing call announcements associated with negative wealth effects?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 149-157.
    15. Nobuyuki Isagawa, 2000. "Convertible debt: an effective financial instrument to control managerial opportunism," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(1), pages 15-26, March.

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