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Convertible debt: an effective financial instrument to control managerial opportunism

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  • Isagawa, Nobuyuki
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Review of Financial Economics.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 15-26

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:revfin:v:9:y:2000:i:1:p:15-26

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620170

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    References

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    1. Walter Novaes & Luigi Zingales, 1995. "Capital Structure Choice when Managers are in Control: Entrenchment versus Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 5384, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1994. "Debt and Seniority: An Analysis of the Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management," NBER Working Papers 4886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jaffee, Dwight & Shleifer, Andrei, 1990. "Costs of Financial Distress, Delayed Calls of Convertible Bonds, and the Role of Investment Banks," Scholarly Articles 3606238, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. K. G. Nyborg, 1996. "The use and pricing of convertible bonds," Applied Mathematical Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 167-190.
    5. Green, Richard C., 1984. "Investment incentives, debt, and warrants," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 115-136, March.
    6. Kang, Jun-Koo & Stulz, Rene M, 1996. "How Different Is Japanese Corporate Finance? An Investigation of the Information Content of New Security Issues," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 109-39.
    7. Hirshleifer, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1992. "Managerial Conservatism, Project Choice, and Debt," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 437-70.
    8. Brennan, Michael J & Kraus, Alan, 1987. " Efficient Financing under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(5), pages 1225-43, December.
    9. Jalan, P. & Barone-Adesi, G., 1995. "Equity financing and corporate convertible bond policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 187-206, May.
    10. Leland E. Crabbe & Jean Hewlege, 1994. "Alternative Tests of Agency Theories of Callable Corporate Bonds," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 23(4), Winter.
    11. Stein, Jeremy C., 1992. "Convertible bonds as backdoor equity financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 3-21, August.
    12. Zwiebel, Jeffrey, 1996. "Dynamic Capital Structure under Managerial Entrenchment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1197-1215, December.
    13. Stulz, ReneM., 1990. "Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 3-27, July.
    14. Nyborg Kjell G., 1995. "Convertible Debt as Delayed Equity: Forced versus Voluntary Conversion and the Information Role of Call Policy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 358-395, October.
    15. Sanford Grossman & Oliver Hart, . "Corporate Financial Structure and Managerial Incentives," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 21-79, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
    16. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
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    Cited by:
    1. Loncarski, I. & Horst, J.R. ter & Veld, C.H., 2006. "Why do Companies issue Convertible Bond Loans? An Empirical Analysis for the Canadian Market," Discussion Paper 2006-65, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

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