IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v210y2023icp265-287.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Polycentricity and adaptation: A multilevel selectionist approach

Author

Listed:
  • Schaefer, Alexander

Abstract

Polycentric organizations allow highly functional, or “group-beneficial,” outcomes to emerge from the myopic behavior of rule-guided individuals. How does polycentricity achieve this feat? Drawing on multilevel selection theory, I argue that polycentric orders support successful outcomes by defining group boundaries and reducing within-group fitness variance relative to between-group variance. The Price equation suggests that, by doing so, polycentric orders facilitate a process of collectively beneficial adaptation, including the capacity to evolve mechanisms for monitoring and punishing rule violators.

Suggested Citation

  • Schaefer, Alexander, 2023. "Polycentricity and adaptation: A multilevel selectionist approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 265-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:210:y:2023:i:c:p:265-287
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.004
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268123001099
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.04.004?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Axelrod, Robert, 1986. "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 80(4), pages 1095-1111, December.
    2. Aligica,Paul Dragos, 2018. "Public Entrepreneurship, Citizenship, and Self-Governance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107186095.
    3. Orbell, John M. & Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Simmons, Randy T., 1984. "Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 78(1), pages 147-162, March.
    4. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    5. Aligica,Paul Dragos, 2018. "Public Entrepreneurship, Citizenship, and Self-Governance," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781316637012.
    6. Kendall, Willmoore, 1960. "The “Open Society†and its Fallacies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(4), pages 972-979, December.
    7. Ostrom, Vincent & Tiebout, Charles M. & Warren, Robert, 1961. "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 55(4), pages 831-842, December.
    8. Krister Andersson & Elinor Ostrom, 2008. "Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 41(1), pages 71-93, March.
    9. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    10. Wilson, David Sloan & Ostrom, Elinor & Cox, Michael E., 2013. "Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages 21-32.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055.
    2. Skarbek, David, 2016. "Covenants without the Sword? Comparing Prison Self-Governance Globally," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 110(4), pages 845-862, November.
    3. Jordan K. Lofthouse & Roberta Q. Herzberg, 2023. "The Continuing Case for a Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-24, February.
    4. Ahn, T.K. & Isaac, R. Mark & Salmon, Timothy C., 2009. "Coming and going: Experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 336-351, February.
    5. STEVEN C. DELLER & David G. Hinds & Donald L. Hinman, 2001. "Local Public Services in Wisconsin: Alternatives for Municipalities with a Focus on Privatization," Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Staff Papers 441, Wisconsin-Madison Agricultural and Applied Economics Department.
    6. William J. Luther, 2021. "Behavioral and Policy Responses to COVID-19: Evidence from Google Mobility Data on State- Level Stay-at-Home Orders," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 36(Fall 2021), pages 67-89.
    7. Tavares Antonio F., 2018. "Municipal amalgamations and their effects: a literature review," Miscellanea Geographica. Regional Studies on Development, Sciendo, vol. 22(1), pages 5-15, March.
    8. Mark Schneider & Byung Ji, 1987. "The flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 27-39, January.
    9. Gaigné, Carl & Riou, Stéphane & Thisse, Jacques-François, 2016. "How to make the metropolitan area work? Neither big government, nor laissez-faire," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 100-113.
    10. Peter J. Boettke & Liya Palagashvili, 2015. "Taming Leviathan," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 279-303.
    11. Mark Koyama, 2012. "Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 95-130.
    12. Michael Fotos, 2015. "Vincent Ostrom’s revolutionary science of association," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 67-83, April.
    13. repec:wly:soecon:v:80:4:y:2014:p:926-937 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Ramón Cobo-Reyes & Gabriel Katz & Thomas Markussen & Simone Meraglia, 2022. "Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 619-677, April.
    15. Xiang Wei & Peng Xu & Shuiting Du & Guanghui Yan & Huayan Pei, 2021. "Reputational preference-based payoff punishment promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemmas," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 94(10), pages 1-7, October.
    16. Peter Boettke & Christopher Coyne & Peter Leeson, 2011. "Quasimarket failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 149(1), pages 209-224, October.
    17. Biehl, J. & Köppel, J. & Grimm, M., 2021. "Creating space for wind energy in a polycentric governance setting," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
    18. Talbot Page & Louis Putterman & Bulent Unel, 2005. "Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1032-1053, October.
    19. Wojtek Przepiorka & Andreas Diekmann, 2020. "Binding Contracts, Non-Binding Promises and Social Feedback in the Intertemporal Common-Pool Resource Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-21, January.
    20. Ledyard, John O., "undated". "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    21. Hartwell, Christopher A. & Otrachshenko, Vladimir & Popova, Olga, 2021. "Waxing power, waning pollution: The effect of COVID-19 on Russian environmental policymaking," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:210:y:2023:i:c:p:265-287. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.