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Priming the jury by asking for Donations: An empirical and experimental study

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  • Aimone, Jason A.
  • North, Charles
  • Rentschler, Lucas

Abstract

In 1995, Texas passed a law requiring that jurors be provided an opportunity to donate jury pay to a crime victims fund. In practice, courts present this opportunity before jury selection begins, priming the jurors about the needs of crime victims, which could bias jury decision-making. We report correlational evidence that conviction rates increased after this policy was imposed. To explore a causal link, we ran a laboratory experiment, finding that male jurors are more likely to convict a defendant after being given the opportunity to donate, while female jurors are less likely to convict.

Suggested Citation

  • Aimone, Jason A. & North, Charles & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Priming the jury by asking for Donations: An empirical and experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 158-167.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:160:y:2019:i:c:p:158-167
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.022
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aimone, Jason A. & Hudja, Stanton & Law, Wilson & North, Charles M. & Ralston, Jason & Rentschler, Lucas, 2023. "An experimental exploration of reasonable doubt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 873-886.
    2. Lundberg, Alexander & Mungan, Murat, 2022. "The effect of evidentiary rules on conviction rates," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 563-576.
    3. Jason Ralston & Jason Aimone & Lucas Rentschler & Charles North, 2023. "Prosecutor plea bargaining and conviction rate structure: evidence from an experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 299-329, September.
    4. Jonathan H.W. Tan & Zhao Zichen & Daniel John Zizzo, 2023. "Scientific Inference from Field and Laboratory Economic Experiments: Empirical Evidence," Discussion Papers Series 663, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Law; Policy; Jury; Experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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