Does Free Exit Reduce Shirking in Production Teams?
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Comparative Economics.
Volume (Year): 17 (1993)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622864
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