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Formal Markets and Informal Insurance

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  • Ligon, Ethan

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  • Ligon, Ethan, 2005. "Formal Markets and Informal Insurance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 75-88, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:1:p:75-88
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    2. Phelan, Christopher, 1998. "On the Long Run Implications of Repeated Moral Hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 174-191, April.
    3. Youngjae Lim & Robert Townsend, 1998. "General Equilibrium Models of Financial Systems: Theory and Measurement in Village Economies," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 1(1), pages 59-118, January.
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    5. Andrew Atkeson & Robert E. Lucas, 1992. "On Efficient Distribution With Private Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 427-453.
    6. Townsend, Robert M, 1994. "Risk and Insurance in Village India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 539-591, May.
    7. Ethan Ligon, 1998. "Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economies," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(4), pages 847-864.
    8. Deaton, Angus & Paxson, Christina, 1994. "Intertemporal Choice and Inequality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(3), pages 437-467, June.
    9. James M. Malcomson & Frans Spinnewyn, 1988. "The Multiperiod Principal-Agent Problem," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(3), pages 391-407.
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    12. Townsend, Robert M, 1982. "Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1166-1186, December.
    13. Richard A. Lambert, 1983. "Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 441-452, Autumn.
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    15. Stephen E. Spear & Sanjay Srivastava, 1987. "On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 599-617.
    16. Hansen, Lars Peter & Heaton, John & Yaron, Amir, 1996. "Finite-Sample Properties of Some Alternative GMM Estimators," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 14(3), pages 262-280, July.
    17. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Narayana Kocherlakota & Luigi Pistaferri, 2009. "Asset Pricing Implications of Pareto Optimality with Private Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(3), pages 555-590, June.
    2. Nejat Anbarci & Mustafa Caglayan, 2005. "Cadaveric Vs. Live-Donor Kidney Transplants: The Interaction Of Institutions And Inequality," Working Papers 2005_25, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    3. Narayana Kocherlakota & Luigi Pistaferri, 2008. "Household Heterogeneity and Asset Trade: Resolving the Equity Premium Puzzle in Three Countries," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001886, UCLA Department of Economics.

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