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International harmonization of the patent-issuing rules

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  • Miyagiwa, Kaz
  • Ohno, Yuka

Abstract

Using a dynamic model of patent races for two sequential innovations, Scotchmer & Green (1990) compared the effect on R&D incentives of the two patent-issuing rules, first-to-invent and first-to-file, and found first-to-file more conducive to R&D. We show that their result depends on their assumption of fixed innovation probabilities. When innovation probabilities are endogenous for the intermediate invention, their result can be reversed. Our analysis has the obvious implications on the evaluation of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (2011), whereby the U.S. switched from first-to-invent to first-to-file.

Suggested Citation

  • Miyagiwa, Kaz & Ohno, Yuka, 2015. "International harmonization of the patent-issuing rules," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 81-89.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:39:y:2015:i:c:p:81-89
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.02.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tina Kao, 2009. "Strategic Licensing And Sequential Innovations," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 77(4), pages 512-551, July.
    2. Josh Lerner, 2003. "The Patent System and Competition," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000577, David K. Levine.
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    4. Tom Lee & Louis L. Wilde, 1980. "Market Structure and Innovation: A Reformulation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 94(2), pages 429-436.
    5. Kaz Miyagiwa, 2015. "The 2011 America Invents Act: Does it Undermine Innovation?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 211-227, June.
    6. Howard F. Chang, 1995. "Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 34-57, Spring.
    7. Shih-tse Lo & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, 2009. "Does it Matter Who Has the Right to Patent: First-to-invent or First-to-file? Lessons From Canada," NBER Working Papers 14926, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Linda R. Cohen & Jun Ishii, 2005. "Competition, Innovation and Racing for Priority at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office," Working Papers 050604, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tetsugen Haruyama & Kaz Miyagiwa, 2018. "The Patent-issuing Rules and Economic Growth: Are We in a "Wrong" Patent Regime?," Working Papers 1805, Florida International University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    R&D competition; Patent laws and legislation; Intellectual property rights; Patent priority rules; Sequential innovation; Management of technological innovation and R&D;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O3 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade

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