Optimal patentability requirements with complementary innovations
AbstractWe study optimal patent design, contrasting the case that two or more innovations are needed to operate a new technology with the traditional case that a single innovation is directly commercialisable. The major finding is that with complementary innovations the patentability requirements should be stronger than in the case of stand-alone innovation. This reduces the fragmentation of intellectual property, which is socially costly. However, to preserve the incentives to innovate, if a patent is granted the strength of protection should be generally higher than in the stand-alone case.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 56 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Patents; Complementary innovations; Patentability requirements; Fragmentation of intellectual property rights;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- O3 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights
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