Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegotiation
AbstractThis paper looks at implementation in economic environments when agents have perfect information about the state of the world, but cannot commit not to renegotiate bad outcomes or to collude against each other. If renegotiation satisfies a weak condition of disagreement point monotonicity, then any Pareto-efficient social choice function can be implemented if there are at least three agents who play undominated Nash equilibria. The mechanism does not use modulo or integer games, has no bad mixed strategy equilibria and is "bounded".
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 26 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Other versions of this item:
- Sjostrom, T., 1997. "Undominated Nash Implementation with Collusion and Renegociation," ISER Discussion Paper 0448, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Tomas Sjostrom, 1997. "Undominated Nash Implementaion with Collusion and Renegotiation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1791, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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- Jackson, Matthew O., 1999.
"A Crash Course in Implementation Theory,"
1076, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Eric Maskin & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001.
Economics Working Papers
0006, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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