IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v139y2023icp200-215.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources

Author

Listed:
  • Deligkas, Argyrios
  • Filos-Ratsikas, Aris
  • Voudouris, Alexandros A.

Abstract

We initiate the study of the heterogeneous facility location problem with limited resources. We mainly focus on the fundamental case where a set of agents are positioned in the line segment [0,1] and have approval preferences over two available facilities. A mechanism takes as input the positions and the preferences of the agents, and chooses to locate a single facility based on this information. We study mechanisms that aim to maximize the social welfare (the total utility the agents derive from facilities they approve), under the constraint of incentivizing the agents to truthfully report their positions and preferences. We consider three different settings depending on the level of agent-related information that is public or private. For each setting, we design deterministic and randomized strategyproof mechanisms that achieve a good approximation of the optimal social welfare, and complement these with nearly-tight impossibility results.

Suggested Citation

  • Deligkas, Argyrios & Filos-Ratsikas, Aris & Voudouris, Alexandros A., 2023. "Heterogeneous facility location with limited resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 200-215.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:139:y:2023:i:c:p:200-215
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825623000313
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.001?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elliot Anshelevich & Aris Filos-Ratsikas & Nisarg Shah & Alexandros A. Voudouris, 2021. "Distortion in Social Choice Problems: The First 15 Years and Beyond," Papers 2103.00911, arXiv.org.
    2. Noga Alon & Michal Feldman & Ariel D. Procaccia & Moshe Tennenholtz, 2010. "Strategyproof Approximation of the Minimax on Networks," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 35(3), pages 513-526, August.
    3. Qiang Zhang & Minming Li, 2014. "Strategyproof mechanism design for facility location games with weighted agents on a line," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 756-773, November.
    4. Lili Mei & Deshi Ye & Yong Zhang, 2018. "Approximation strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility location on a line," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 549-571, August.
    5. Schummer, James & Vohra, Rakesh V., 2002. "Strategy-proof Location on a Network," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 405-428, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Sina Abbasi & Maryam Moosivand & Ilias Vlachos & Mohammad Talooni, 2023. "Designing the Location–Routing Problem for a Cold Supply Chain Considering the COVID-19 Disaster," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(21), pages 1-24, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lili Mei & Deshi Ye & Yong Zhang, 2018. "Approximation strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility location on a line," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 549-571, August.
    2. Takashi Kurihara & Koichi Suga, 2020. "Decision–making on public facility location by using social choice rules with a deliberative suggestion," Working Papers 1924, Waseda University, Faculty of Political Science and Economics.
    3. Itai Feigenbaum & Jay Sethuraman & Chun Ye, 2017. "Approximately Optimal Mechanisms for Strategyproof Facility Location: Minimizing L p Norm of Costs," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 42(2), pages 434-447, May.
    4. Qi Zhao & Wenjing Liu & Qingqin Nong & Qizhi Fang, 2023. "Constrained heterogeneous facility location games with max-variant cost," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 1-20, April.
    5. Xin Chen & Qizhi Fang & Wenjing Liu & Yuan Ding & Qingqin Nong, 2022. "Strategyproof mechanisms for 2-facility location games with minimax envy," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 43(5), pages 1628-1644, July.
    6. Michel Breton & Vera Zaporozhets, 2009. "On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(2), pages 287-309, August.
    7. Sidartha Gordon, 2015. "Unanimity in attribute-based preference domains," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 44(1), pages 13-29, January.
    8. Barberà, Salvador & Berga, Dolors & Moreno, Bernardo, 2010. "Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1648-1674, September.
    9. Chatterji, Shurojit & Zeng, Huaxia, 2023. "A taxonomy of non-dictatorial unidimensional domains," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 228-269.
    10. Bossert, Walter & Sprumont, Yves, 2014. "Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 109-126.
    11. Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge & Vorsatz, Marc, 2018. "Strategy-proof location of public facilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 21-48.
    12. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sanver, Remzi & Sen, Arunava, 2013. "On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 1050-1073.
    13. Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Unanimity in Attribute-Based Preference Domains," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01061994, HAL.
    14. Stergios Athanasoglou & Somouaoga Bonkoungou & Lars Ehlers, 2023. "Strategy-proof preference aggregation and the anonymity-neutrality tradeoff," Working Papers 519, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    15. Mishra, Debasis & Roy, Souvik, 2012. "Strategy-proof partitioning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 285-300.
    16. Chatterji, Shurojit & Sen, Arunava & Zeng, Huaxia, 2016. "A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    17. Ehlers, Lars, 2001. "Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 239-250, March.
    18. Jordi Massó & Shurojit Chatterji, 2015. "On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 952.15, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    19. , & , & ,, 2007. "Secure implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(3), September.
    20. Sumit Goel & Wade Hann-Caruthers, 2023. "Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(1), pages 11-34, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:139:y:2023:i:c:p:200-215. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.