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Do firms using real earnings management care about taxes? Evidence from a high book-tax conformity country

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  • Kałdoński, Michał
  • Jewartowski, Tomasz

Abstract

Using a sample of 1,149 firm-year observations we show that benchmark-beating firms entering into real earnings manipulation are less willing to engage in aggressive tax planning. Controlling for a “normal level” of tax aggressiveness within the industry we provide evidence that average GAAP effective tax rate for benchmark-beaters is higher than for their industry peers. One of the possible reasons may be unwanted scrutiny by tax authorities and external monitors that hinders the real activities manipulation. All in all, our results suggest that real earnings management is even more costly than is widely considered.

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  • Kałdoński, Michał & Jewartowski, Tomasz, 2020. "Do firms using real earnings management care about taxes? Evidence from a high book-tax conformity country," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:35:y:2020:i:c:s1544612319307391
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2019.101351
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Francisco J. Delgado & Elena Fernández-Rodríguez & Roberto García-Fernández & Manuel Landajo & Antonio Martínez-Arias, 2023. "Tax avoidance and earnings management: a neural network approach for the largest European economies," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 9(1), pages 1-25, December.
    3. Amin, Qazi Awais & Cumming, Douglas, 2021. "Blockholders and real earnings management-the emerging markets context," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    4. Duy, Nguyen Vu & Tran, Tien Quang, 2021. "The influence of international standards on SME tax compliance in Vietnam," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    5. Ahsan Habib & Dinithi Ranasinghe & Julia Yonghua Wu & Pallab Kumar Biswas & Fawad Ahmad, 2022. "Real earnings management: A review of the international literature," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(4), pages 4279-4344, December.
    6. Yang, Jingwen & Hemmings, Danial & Jaafar, Aziz & Jackson, Richard H.G., 2022. "The real earnings management gap between private and public firms: Evidence from Europe," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    7. Koga, Yuya & Yamaguchi, Tomoyasu, 2023. "Does mandatory quarterly reporting induce managerial myopic behavior? Evidence from Japan," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Earnings management; Corporate tax aggressiveness; Earnings targets;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - General

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