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The 'perverse' effects of wage and price controls in search markets

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  • Fershtman, Chaim
  • Fishman, Arthur

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 38 (1994)
Issue (Month): 5 (May)
Pages: 1099-1112

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:5:p:1099-1112

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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Cited by:
  1. Michael Rauh, 2005. "Complementarity, Search, and Price Dispersion," Game Theory and Information 0508008, EconWPA.
  2. Obradovits, Martin, 2012. "Austrian-style gasoline price regulation: How it may backfire," MPRA Paper 42529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Rauh, Michael T., 2004. "Wage and price controls in the equilibrium sequential search model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(6), pages 1287-1300, December.
  4. ArnabK. Basu & NancyH. Chau & Ravi Kanbur, 2010. "Turning a Blind Eye: Costly Enforcement, Credible Commitment and Minimum Wage Laws," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 120(543), pages 244-269, 03.
  5. Mark Armstrong, 2014. "Search and Ripoff Externalities," Economics Series Working Papers 715, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  6. Martin Dufwenberg & Uri Gneezy & Jacob Goeree & Rosemarie Nagel, 2007. "Price floors and competition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 211-224, October.
  7. Ralph Bradburd & Stephen Sheppard & Joseph Bergeron & Eric Engler, 2006. "The Impact Of Rent Controls In Non-Walrasian Markets: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 455-491.
  8. Jose Luis Moraga-Gonzalez & Zsolt Sandor & Matthijs R. Wildenbeest, 2008. "Nonparametric Estimation of the Costs of Non-Sequential Search," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-102/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  9. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers & Jidong Zhou, 2009. "Consumer Protection and the Incentive to Become Informed," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(2-3), pages 399-410, 04-05.
  10. Armstrong, Mark, 2011. "Economic models of consumer protection policies," MPRA Paper 34773, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Gu, Yiquan & Wenzel, Tobias, 2012. "Strategic obfuscation and consumer protection policy in financial markets: Theory and experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 76, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

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