The Impact Of Rent Controls In Non-Walrasian Markets: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach
AbstractWe use agent-based models to consider rent ceilings in non-Walrasian housing markets, where bargaining between landlord and tenant leads to exchange at a range of prices. In the non-Walrasian setting agents who would be extramarginal in the Walrasian setting frequently are successful in renting, and actually account for a significant share of the units rented. This has several implications. First, rent ceilings above the Walrasian equilibrium price (WEP) can affect the market outcome. Second, rent ceilings that reduce the number of units rented do not necessarily reduce total market surplus. Finally, the distributional impact of rent controls differs from the Walrasian setting. Copyright Blackwell Publishing, Inc. 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Journal of Regional Science.
Volume (Year): 46 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Ralph Bradburd & Stephen Sheppard & Joseph Bergeron & Eric Engler, 2004. "The Impact of Rent Controls in Non-Walrasian Markets: An Agent-Based Modeling Approach," Department of Economics Working Papers 2004-05, Department of Economics, Williams College, revised May 2005.
- R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets
- R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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