Economic models of consumer protection policies
AbstractThis paper summarizes some of my recent work on consumer protection. I present three theoretical models which illustrate the merits and drawbacks of a number of common consumer protection policies, namely: policies which prevent firms from setting unduly high prices; policies which prevent firms requiring on-the-spot decision making by prospective customers, and policies which prevent suppliers from paying commission payments to sales intermediaries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 34773.
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Consumer protection; consumer search; marketing; commission sales;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-11-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MKT-2011-11-21 (Marketing)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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