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On the theory of repeated games with private information : Part I: anti-folk theorem without communication Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matsushima, Hitoshi
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters .
Volume (Year): 35 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 253-256
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:3:p:253-256Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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