Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109108
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More about this item
Keywords
Hidden action; Hidden information; Belief manipulation; Relationship termination;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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