Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

On continuous-time Markov processes in bargaining

Contents:

Author Info

  • Houba, Harold

Abstract

For bilateral stochastic bargaining procedures embedded in stable homogeneous continuous-time Markov processes, we show unusual limit results when time between rounds vanish. Standard convergence results require that some states are instantaneous.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4RV7Y7S-6/1/88c8691f000796ab08b93e9cfbcc49a8
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 100 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 280-283

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:280-283

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Hoel, Michael, 1987. "Bargaining games with a random sequence of who makes the offers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 5-9.
  2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  3. Roth, Alvin E, 1985. "A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 207-11, January.
  4. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
  5. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
  6. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  7. Houba, Harold, 2007. "Alternating offers in economic environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 316-324, September.
  8. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Herings P. Jean-Jacques & Houba Harold, 2010. "The Condercet Paradox Revisited," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  2. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2010. "The Condorcet Paradox Revisited," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-026/1, Tinbergen Institute.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:2:p:280-283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.