IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v100y2008i1p153-156.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why quantity premia are rare?

Author

Listed:
  • Kokovin, Sergey
  • Nahata, Babu
  • Zhelobodko, Evgeny

Abstract

Using linear demands for two types of consumers, this note shows why discounts are ubiquitous and premia are rare. By observing premia, one can infer that the package sold at premium is undistorted and the single-crossing condition must hold.

Suggested Citation

  • Kokovin, Sergey & Nahata, Babu & Zhelobodko, Evgeny, 2008. "Why quantity premia are rare?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 153-156, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:153-156
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(07)00432-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gerstner, Eitan & Hess, James D, 1987. "Why Do Hot Dogs Come in Packs of 10 and Buns in 8s or 12s? A Demand-Side Investigation," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 60(4), pages 491-517, October.
    2. Frank Verboven, 1999. "Product Line Rivalry and Market Segmentation—with an Application to Automobile Optional Engine Pricing," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(4), pages 399-425, December.
    3. Guesnerie, Roger & Seade, Jesus, 1982. "Nonlinear pricing in a finite economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 157-179, March.
    4. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nana Adrian, 2019. "Price Discrimination and Salient Thinking," Diskussionsschriften dp1906, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nana Adrian, 2019. "Price Discrimination and Salient Thinking," Diskussionsschriften dp1906, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    2. Kokovin Sergey & Zhelobodko Evgeniy, 2008. "Diagnosing Efficiency of Distortion in Discrete Screening," EERC Working Paper Series 08/02e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    3. Brett, Craig & Weymark, John A., 2011. "How optimal nonlinear income taxes change when the distribution of the population changes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1239-1247.
    4. Stole, Lars A., 2007. "Price Discrimination and Competition," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 34, pages 2221-2299, Elsevier.
    5. Gauthier, Stéphane & Laroque, Guy, 2014. "On the value of randomization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 493-507.
    6. Mark Armstrong, 2016. "Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 583-614, October.
    7. repec:hal:pseose:hal-00969344 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Kimmo Berg, 2013. "Complexity of solution structures in nonlinear pricing," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 206(1), pages 23-37, July.
    9. Andersson, Tommy, 2004. "Essays on Nonlinear Pricing and Welfare," MPRA Paper 59446, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Cohen, Andrew, 2008. "Package size and price discrimination in the paper towel market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 502-516, March.
    11. Matthews, Steven & Moore, John, 1987. "Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 441-467, March.
    12. Chambers, Robert G., 1989. "On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms," Working Papers 197741, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    13. Lee, Hyunok & Chambers, Robert G., 1989. "Optimal Farm Credit Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 197624, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    14. Julie Holland Mortimer, 2005. "Price Discrimination, Copyright Law, and Technological Innovation: Evidence from the Introduction of DVDs," NBER Working Papers 11676, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Bonatti, Alessandro & Bergemann, Dirk, 2022. "Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 17544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. George Deltas & Thanasis Stengos & Eleftherios Zacharias, 2011. "Product line pricing in a vertically differentiated oligopoly," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(3), pages 907-929, August.
    17. Ionela Munteanu & Adriana Grigorescu & Elena Condrea & Elena Pelinescu, 2020. "Convergent Insights for Sustainable Development and Ethical Cohesion: An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance in Romanian Public Entities," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-17, April.
    18. Renato Gomes & Alessandro Pavan, 2013. "Cross-Subsidization and Matching Design," Discussion Papers 1559, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    19. Nahata, Babu & Ringbom, Staffan, 2007. "Price discrimination using linear and nonlinear pricing simultaneously," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 267-271, May.
    20. Massimo Morelli & Huanxing Yang & Lixin Ye, 2012. "Competitive Nonlinear Taxation and Constitutional Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 142-175, February.
    21. Prieto, Marc & Caemmerer, Barbara & Baltas, George, 2015. "Using a hedonic price model to test prospect theory assertions: The asymmetrical and nonlinear effect of reliability on used car prices," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 206-212.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:153-156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.