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Busy directors and firm performance: Does firm location matter?

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  • James, Hui Liang
  • Wang, Hongxia
  • Xie, Yamin

Abstract

We examine whether busy directors’ impacts on firm performance vary with firm headquarter locations. We classify firms into Metro and Rural firms based on their headquarter locations. Using a sample of 11,537 firm-year observations from 1997 to 2013, we find that Metro firm busy directors significantly enhance firm performance and are associated with lower default risk, lower cash effective tax rate, lower real earnings management, and more efficient assets utilization. We further show busy independent directors enhance firm performance after the 2007–2008 financial crisis, but not in the early years after SOX. Interestingly, the results indicate that SOX compromises the effectiveness of busy inside directors in Metro firms in the post-SOX period. The location effect is robust across multiple model specifications and various measures of director busyness and Metro firms. We conclude that firm location affects the effectiveness of busy directors and Metro firms benefit more from directors with multiple directorships.

Suggested Citation

  • James, Hui Liang & Wang, Hongxia & Xie, Yamin, 2018. "Busy directors and firm performance: Does firm location matter?," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 1-37.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:45:y:2018:i:c:p:1-37
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2018.01.010
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    Cited by:

    1. Sun, Liang, 2021. "Does the location of directors' additional positions matter? A new dimension of board structure," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    2. Qi Wang & Maoxia Sun & Kongwen Wang, 2023. "Do Reputation Incentives Matter? Busy Directors and Corporate Social Responsibility in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(6), pages 1-17, March.
    3. Le, Quyen & Vafaei, Alireza & Ahmed, Kamran & Kutubi, Shawgat, 2022. "Independent directors' reputation incentives and firm performance – an Australian perspective," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    4. Anh‐Tuan Doan & Anh‐Tuan Le & Quan Tran, 2020. "Economic uncertainty, ownership structure and small and medium enterprises performance," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 102-137, June.
    5. Bradley Benson & Travis Davidson & Hui James & Hongxia Wang, 2022. "Board busyness and corporate payout: are all busy directors the same?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(3), pages 3711-3759, September.
    6. Melinda Cahyaning Ratri & Iman Harymawan & Khairul Anuar Kamarudin, 2021. "Busyness, Tenure, Meeting Frequency of the CEOs, and Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(10), pages 1-22, May.
    7. Xia, Changyuan & Zhang, Xiaowei & Cao, Chunfang & Xu, Nan, 2019. "Independent director connectedness in China: An examination of the trade credit financing hypothesis," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 209-225.

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    19. Bulan, Laarni & Sanyal, Paroma & Yan, Zhipeng, 2010. "A few bad apples: An analysis of CEO performance pay and firm productivity," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 273-306, July.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Busy directors; Busy inside directors; Busy independent directors; Metro firms; Rural firms; Firm performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

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