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Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation

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  • Shan, Yaping

Abstract

This paper studies the agency problem between a firm and its research employees in a dynamic optimal contracting setting. We implement the optimal contract by a risky security, which can be created using the equity of the firm, and a sequence of performance-based holding requirements. This result provides a rationale for using performance-vested equity-based compensation in R&D-intensive start-up firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Shan, Yaping, 2019. "Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 44-69.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:102:y:2019:i:c:p:44-69
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.02.007
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Performance-vesting provisions; Dynamic contract; R&D;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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