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Is the stakeholder model dead?

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  • Beaver, William

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  • Beaver, William, 1999. "Is the stakeholder model dead?," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 8-12.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:bushor:v:42:y:1999:i:2:p:8-12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles Kahn & Andrew Winton, 1998. "Ownership Structure, Speculation, and Shareholder Intervention," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 99-129, February.
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    1. Ding, Yuan & Richard, Jacques & Stolowy, Hervé, 2008. "Towards an understanding of the phases of goodwill accounting in four Western capitalist countries: From stakeholder model to shareholder model," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(7-8), pages 718-755.
    2. Mathieu Floquet, 2010. "Informations Aux Actionnaires Et Informations Aux Salariés : Une Analyse Textuelle Du Rapport Annuel Et Du Rapport De L'Expert-Comptable Du Comité D'Entreprise," Post-Print hal-00481504, HAL.

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