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Audit the taxpayer, not the return: Tax auditing as an expression game

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  • Pentland, Brian T.
  • Carlile, Paul

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  • Pentland, Brian T. & Carlile, Paul, 1996. "Audit the taxpayer, not the return: Tax auditing as an expression game," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 21(2-3), pages 269-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:21:y:1996:i:2-3:p:269-287
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
    3. Graetz, Michael J & Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, Spring.
    4. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, 1988. "A Note on Enforcement Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(4), pages 793-798.
    5. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
    6. Plumlee, Rd, 1985. "The Standard Of Objectivity For Internal Auditors - Memory And Bias Effects," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 683-699.
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    Cited by:

    1. Margaret Lamb & Andrew Lymer, 1999. "Taxation research in an accounting context: future prospects and interdisciplinary perspectives," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(4), pages 749-776.
    2. Ausloos, Marcel & Cerqueti, Roy & Mir, Tariq A., 2017. "Data science for assessing possible tax income manipulation: The case of Italy," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 238-256.
    3. Rihab Khalifa & Nina Sharma & Christopher Humphrey & Keith Robson, 2007. "Discourse and audit change," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 20(6), pages 825-854, October.
    4. Carlene Beth Wynter & Lynne Oats, 2021. "Knock, Knock: The Taxman’s at Your Door! Practice Sense, Empathy Games, and Dilemmas in Tax Enforcement," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 169(2), pages 279-292, March.
    5. Boll, Karen, 2014. "Shady car dealings and taxing work practices: An ethnography of a tax audit process," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-19.
    6. Mueller, Frank, 2018. "Taking Goffman seriously: Developing Strategy-as-Practice," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 16-30.
    7. Andrew Yim, 2009. "Efficient Committed Budget for Implementing Target Audit Probability for Many Inspectees," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(12), pages 2000-2018, December.
    8. Lamb, Margaret, 2001. "'Horrid appealing': accounting for taxable profits in mid-nineteenth century England," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 271-298, April.
    9. Aregbesola, O.D & Owosekun, A.O & Salawu, R.O, 2020. "Marital Status and Educational Background as Determinants of Tax Compliance in Nigeria," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 4(8), pages 777-783, August.
    10. Radcliffe, Vaughan S., 1999. "Knowing efficiency: the enactment of efficiency in efficiency auditing," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 333-362, May.
    11. Peters, Katharina, 2001. "When reform comes into play: budgeting as negotiations between administrations," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 521-539, August.
    12. Rowe, Casey & Shields, Michael D. & Birnberg, Jacob G., 2012. "Hardening soft accounting information: Games for planning organizational change," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 37(4), pages 260-279.
    13. Peters, Katharina, 1999. "Wenn Reform ins Spiel kommt: Über das inneradministrative Verhandeln von Berliner Globalsummen," Discussion Papers, Research Group Metropolitan City Studies FS II 99-505, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    14. Pentland, Brian T., 2000. "Will auditors take over the world? Program, technique and the verification of everything," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 307-312, April.
    15. Vollmer, Hendrik, 2007. "How to do more with numbers: Elementary stakes, framing, keying, and the three-dimensional character of numerical signs," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 577-600, August.
    16. Power, Michael K., 2003. "Auditing and the production of legitimacy," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 379-394, May.
    17. Malcolm Anderson, 1998. "Accounting History Publications, 1995/6," Accounting History Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 105-124.
    18. Peters, Katharina, 2000. "When reform comes into play: Budgeting as negotiations between administrations," Discussion Papers, Research Group Metropolitan City Studies FS II 00-501, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

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