Verifiable Offers and the Relationship Between Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations
AbstractWe use the experimental method to compare second-price auctions with 'verifiable' multilateral negotiations in which the sole buyer can credibly reveal to sellers the best price offer he currently holds. Despite the two institutions' seeming equivalence, we find that prices are lower in verifiable multilateral negotiations than in second-price auctions. The difference occurs because low-cost sellers in negotiations often submit initial offers below the second-lowest cost. We also compare the two institutions to previously studied first-price auctions and multilateral negotiations with non-verifiable offers. Second-price auctions yield the highest prices, followed in order by verifiable negotiations, non-verifiable negotiations and first-price auctions. Copyright 2005 Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 115 (2005)
Issue (Month): 506 (October)
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- Charles J. Thomas & Bart J. Wilson, 2008. "Horizontal Product Differentiation in Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 08-03, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Charles J. Thomas, 2012. "An Alternating-Offers Model of Multilateral Negotiations," Working Papers 12-31, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
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