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OPEC and the U.S. Oil Import Tariff

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  • Karp, Larry
  • Newbery, David M

Abstract

Open-loop Nash extraction plans of exhaustible resource producers (in which producers take the plans of others as given) are time consistent, but proposed open-loop oil import tariffs are almost always time inconsistent. The paper derives a time consistent open-loop Nash tariff that can be readily computed for both competitive and a Nash-Cournot specification of the oil market. The authors illustrate the time sequence of the optimal import tariff for a simple model of the United States facing a duopolistic version of OPEC and a comparative fringe of oil producers, and compare the outcome with the competitive equilibrium. Copyright 1991 by Royal Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 101 (1991)
Issue (Month): 405 (March)
Pages: 303-13

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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:101:y:1991:i:405:p:303-13

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Cited by:
  1. Kenji Fujiwara & Ngo Long, 2011. "Welfare Implications of Leadership in a Resource Market under Bilateral Monopoly," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 479-497, December.
  2. Jon Strand, 2008. "Importer and Producer Petroleum Taxation," IMF Working Papers 08/35, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Kisswani, Khalid/ M., 2011. "The effects of the U.S. price control policies on OPEC: lessons from the past," MPRA Paper 34624, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Amundsen, E.S. & Schob, R., 1999. "Environmental Taxes on Exhaustible Resources," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 192, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
  5. Melanie Parravano & Luis Enrique Pedauga, 2008. "Oil market dynamics: A Markow chain analysis," Economía, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (IIES). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales. Universidad de Los Andes. Mérida, Venezuela, vol. 33(25), pages 87-115, january-j.
  6. Amundsen, Eirik Schrøder & Bergman, Lars, 2005. "International Redistribution of Resource Rents: An alternative perspective on the Kyoto process," Working Papers in Economics 08/05, University of Bergen, Department of Economics.
  7. Amundsen, Eirik S. & Bergman, Lars, 2005. "International Redistribution of Resource Rents: An alternative perspective on the Kyoto process," MPRA Paper 10624, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Stephen P.A. Brown & Hillard G. Huntington, 2003. "Terms of trade and OECD policies to mitigate global climate change," Economic and Financial Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.

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