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Radner's Theorem on Teams and Games with a Continuum of Players

Author

Listed:
  • Takashi Ui

    (Hitotsubashi University)

  • Yasunori Yoshizawa

    (Yokohama National University)

Abstract

This note considers Bayesian games with a continuum of players, symmetric quadratic payoff functions, and normally distributed signals. It shows that a recent result on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is implied by a classical theorem on teams by Radner (1962, Ann. Math. Stat. 33).

Suggested Citation

  • Takashi Ui & Yasunori Yoshizawa, 2013. "Radner's Theorem on Teams and Games with a Continuum of Players," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 72-77.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-12-00838
    as

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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2013/Volume33/EB-13-V33-I1-P7.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Joan de Marti Beltran, 2009. "Information Gathering in Organizations: Equilibrium, Welfare, and Optimal Network Structure," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 116-161, March.
    2. Takashi Ui, 2009. "Bayesian potentials and information structures: Team decision problems revisited," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 5(3), pages 271-291, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ryo Kato & Tatsushi Okuda, 2017. "Market Concentration and Sectoral Inflation under Imperfect Common Knowledge," IMES Discussion Paper Series 17-E-11, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    2. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 039, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Takashi Ui, 2022. "Optimal and Robust Disclosure of Public Information," Papers 2203.16809, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    4. Takashi Ui, 2019. "The Lucas Imperfect Information Model with Imperfect Common Knowledge," Working Papers on Central Bank Communication 007, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Economics.
    5. Takashi Ui, 2020. "The Lucas imperfect information model with imperfect common knowledge," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 71(1), pages 85-100, January.
    6. Ui, Takashi & 宇井, 貴志, 2019. "The Lucas Imperfect Information Model with Imperfect Common Knowledge," Discussion Papers 2019-04, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    7. Ui, Takashi & Yoshizawa, Yasunori, 2015. "Characterizing social value of information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PB), pages 507-535.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    unique linear equilibrium; Bayesian potential game; team.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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