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Authority and Efficiency: The Labor Market and the Managerial Revolution of the Late Nineteenth Century

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Author Info
Clark, Gregory

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Abstract

The managerial revolution resulted in the concentration of production decisions in the hands of management. Radical economists and historians have disputed the conventional view that these changes in work organization were necessary to increase production efficiency. Yet curiously there seem to be few issues of fact in dispute between the radical and the conventional accounts. I offer here an interpretation of the radical position which explains why this is so, and why profitable and efficient organizations of work will differ in capitalist economies. The argument hinges on the conditions under which workers were able to act collectively.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal The Journal of Economic History.

Volume (Year): 44 (1984)
Issue (Month): 04 (December)
Pages: 1069-1083
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Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:44:y:1984:i:04:p:1069-1083_03

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  1. Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005. "Hedonic prices and multitask incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-32, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
  2. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 2008. "Consistency in Organization," Discussion Papers in Economics 6569, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Masaki Nakabayashi, 2005. "Hedonic prices and multidimensional incentives," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 05-32-Rev.2, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP), revised May 2006. [Downloadable!]
  4. Flynn, Sean Masaki, 2004. "Why Only Some Industries Unionize: Insights from Reciprocity Theory," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 64, Vassar College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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