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Consistency in Organization

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Author Info
Schlicht, Ekkehart () (University of Munich and IZA Bonn)

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Abstract

Recent thinking has emphasized the importance of consistency in a firm’s compensation policy. By starting from Williamson’s ideas about idiosyncratic exchange, this view can be supplied with some theoretical foundation. At the same time, the consistency view can be applied to a number of organizational issues. It sheds new light on some Williamsonian themes, like the boundaries of the firm or the attenuation of incentives within firms.

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File URL: ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp718.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 718.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp718

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Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
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Web page: http://www.iza.org

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Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
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Related research
Keywords: theory of the firm command routines centralization paradox Williamson's puzzle attenuation of incentives

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Coase, R H, 1978. "Economics and Biology: Evolution, Selection, and the Economic Principle: Discussion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(2), pages 244-45, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-9-1.


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