Making the French pay: The costs and consequences of the Napoleonic reparations
AbstractReparations as an instrument of international peace settlements were abandoned after the failure of Germany to pay its post-World War I indemnity. However, reparations played a useful role in the construction of earlier peace treaties. This article examines the payment of reparations by the French after the Napoleonic Wars. By most measures, these reparations were the largest ever fully paid; and they imposed a high cost on the economy in terms of lost output, consumption, and diminished capital stock. The incentives to pay were appropriately set and payment permitted France to be accepted once again as an equal among the great powers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal European Review of Economic History.
Volume (Year): 5 (2001)
Issue (Month): 03 (December)
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Other versions of this item:
- Eugene White, 1999. "Making the French Pay: The Costs and Consequences of the Napoleonic Reparations," Departmental Working Papers 199924, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- N13 - Economic History - - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations - - - Europe: Pre-1913
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- Michael B. Devereux & Gregor W. Smith, 2005.
"Transfer Problem Dynamics: Macroeconomics of the Franco-Prussian War Indemnity,"
1025, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Devereux, Michael B. & Smith, Gregor W., 2007. "Transfer problem dynamics: Macroeconomics of the Franco-Prussian war indemnity," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2375-2398, November.
- Michael B. Devereux & Gregor W. Smith, 2004. "Transfer Problem Dynamics: Macroeonomics of the Franco-Prussian War Indemnity," Working Papers 022004, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
- Albrecht Ritschl & Tobias Straumann, 2009. "Business cycles and economic policy, 1914-1945: a survey," Economic History Working Papers 22402, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
- Angelo Riva & Eugene N. White, 2010. "Danger on the Exchange: How Counterparty Risk Was Managed on the Paris Bourse in the Nineteenth Century," NBER Working Papers 15634, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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