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Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events

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  • Diermeier, Daniel
  • Stevenson, Randolph T.

Abstract

We present an empirical assessment of Lupia and Strøm's noncooperative bargaining model of cabinet terminations. We construct a stochastic version of the model and derive several testable implications. As the next mandatory election approaches: (1) the probability of an early election increases; (2) a cabinet's risks of being replaced without an intermediate election may be flat or even decrease; and (3) the overall chance that a cabinet falls (for whatever reason) increases. Using nonparametric duration analysis on a 15-country data set, we find qualified support for the Lupia and Strøm model. We conclude that the strategic approach is more promising than the nonstrategic alternative, but a more fully dynamic strategic model will be required to account for the dynamics of cabinet stability.

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  • Diermeier, Daniel & Stevenson, Randolph T., 2000. "Cabinet Terminations and Critical Events," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(3), pages 627-640, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:03:p:627-640_22
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2003. "The Effects of Constitutions on Coalition Governments in Parliamentary Democracies," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Enzo Lenine, 2020. "Modelling Coalitions: From Concept Formation to Tailoring Empirical Explanations," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-12, November.
    3. Torun Dewan & David P. Myatt, 2010. "The Declining Talent Pool of Government," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(2), pages 267-286, April.
    4. Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(2), pages 154-172, April.
    5. Daniel Diermeier & Hulya Eraslan & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "Bicameralism and Government Formation, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 07-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Feb 2007.
    6. Gerald Pech, 2004. "Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 1-24, October.
    7. Kentaro Fukumoto, 2009. "Systematically Dependent Competing Risks and Strategic Retirement," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 740-754, July.
    8. Castro, Vítor & Martins, Rodrigo, 2013. "Is there duration dependence in Portuguese local governments' tenure?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 26-39.
    9. Michael Laver & Scott Marchi & Hande Mutlu, 2011. "Negotiation in legislatures over government formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 285-304, June.
    10. Diermeier, Daniel & Eraslan, Hülya & Merlo, Antonio, 2007. "Bicameralism and Government Formation," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 227-252, August.

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