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Licitación de los terminales portuarios de la zona central de Chile. Competencia y regulación en la industria portuaria

Author

Listed:
  • Aldo González

    (Universidad de Chile)

  • Carolina Moreno

    (Metro S.A.)

Abstract

This article looks at the regulatory dilemmas involved in the port terminal tendering processes in San Antonio and Valparaíso between 2010 and 2013. While basic port service fees were subject to regulation, competition between terminals was chosen as the preferred mechanism for controlling the market power of incumbents. This competition between terminals has enabled the vertical restrictions established in the earliest tendering processes to be relaxed, although restrictions on horizontal integration have been maintained. The article ends with some conclusions to guide future port concession processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Aldo González & Carolina Moreno, 2018. "Licitación de los terminales portuarios de la zona central de Chile. Competencia y regulación en la industria portuaria," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(149), pages 7-40.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpt:journl:v::y:2018:i:149:p:7-40
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 24(1), pages 11-32.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ports; concessions; market regulation; competition policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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