Opportunistic renegotiation of infrastructure concessions as rent seeking: the effect of legal systems Gabriel Garcia Morales
AbstractThis paper examines the problem of renegotiation of infrastructure concessions in Latin America using a model of litigation with an application to incentive contracts. Opportunistic renegotiation is here defined as a rent seeking game, to show the effect of the legal system characteristics in the probability of renegotiation. A main conclusion is that legal systems where each party pays for their own legal expenses, such as the American, are more prone to opportunistic renegotiation. On the other hand, systems, such as the British, that concentrates legal expenses in one party might discourage opportunistic behavior by making it more costly.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by UNIVERSIDAD TECNOLÓGICA DE BOLÍVAR in its journal REVISTA ECONOMÍA & REGIÓN.
Volume (Year): (2011)
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- Klein, Daniel B, 1990.
"The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early America,"
Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 788-812, October.
- Klein, D., 1989. "The Voluntary Provision Of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies Of Early America," Papers 89-08, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
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