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Political Cycles in Military Deployment

Author

Listed:
  • Buts Caroline
  • Raes Steffi

    (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Department of Applied Economics, Brussels, Belgium)

  • Bois Cind Du

    (Royal Military Academy, Department of Economics, Management & Leadership, Brussels, Belgium)

Abstract

The determinants of military deployment have been extensively discussed in the literature. Empirical studies indicate that, next to the international security arena, also domestic socio-economic variables play an important role. For example, wealth and size of the supplying nation tend to positively influence the number of military troops being deployed. The present study contributes to this literature by focusing on a set of political variables, i.e. the effect of upcoming elections as well as the composition of government. For a cross-sectional time-series of 34 democratic countries, covering the period from 1990 until 2014, we run a linear (fixed effects) panel regression model correcting for a first order autoregressive disturbance term as well as linear dynamic models with diverse corrections. When studying deployment at country level, we find a negative and significant impact of elections on the number of troops deployed, meaning that a country deploys fewer troops close to elections. As for government composition, we observe that rather central administrations deploy substantially fewer troops than right- or left-wing governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Buts Caroline & Raes Steffi & Bois Cind Du, 2017. "Political Cycles in Military Deployment," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 23(4), pages 1-7, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:23:y:2017:i:4:p:7:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2017-0025
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Klomp, Jeroen, 2023. "Defending election victory by attacking company revenues: The impact of elections on the international defense industry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    troop contribution; political cycles; foreign policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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