IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/bejtec/vtopics.4y2004i1n6.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices

Author

Listed:
  • Gans Joshua S

    (Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne)

  • King Stephen P

    (University of Melbourne)

  • Lampe Ryan

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

A socially optimal structure of application and renewal fees for patents would encourage the maximal number of applications while reducing effective patent length. We find, however, that when patent offices are required to be self-funding, resource constraints can distort this fee structure. Specifically, a financially constrained, but welfare-oriented, patent office will tend to raise initial application fees while lowering renewal fees. This creates two detriments to social welfare as it discourages the filing of some patents while extending the effective life of others.

Suggested Citation

  • Gans Joshua S & King Stephen P & Lampe Ryan, 2004. "Patent Renewal Fees and Self-Funding Patent Offices," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-15, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.4:y:2004:i:1:n:6
    DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1147
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-598X.1147
    Download Restriction: For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.2202/1534-598X.1147?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Marc Baudry & Béatrice Dumont, 2006. "Patent Renewals as Options: Improving the Mechanism for Weeding Out Lousy Patents," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 28(1), pages 41-62, February.
    2. Picard, Pierre M. & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, Bruno, 2013. "Patent office governance and patent examination quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 14-25.
    3. Danguy Jérôme & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie Bruno, 2011. "Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Community Patent," Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 1-43, April.
    4. Bruno Van Pottelsberghe & Pierre M. Picard, 2011. "Patent office Governance and Patent System Quality," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2011-007, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    5. Jinyoung Kim, 2015. "Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Inventions: Evidence from US Patent Renewal Data," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(2), pages 195-218, September.
    6. Marc Baudry & Béatrice Dumont, 2009. "A Bayesian Real Option Approach to Patents and Optimal Renewal Fees," Working Papers hal-00419330, HAL.
    7. Gaétan de Rassenfosse & Adam B. Jaffe, 2018. "Are patent fees effective at weeding out low‐quality patents?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(1), pages 134-148, March.
    8. Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2019. "Subjective performance of patent examiners, implicit contracts, and self‐funded patent offices," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(3), pages 251-266, April.
    9. Gaetan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2013. "The Role Of Fees In Patent Systems: Theory And Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(4), pages 696-716, September.
    10. Jinyoung Kim, 2015. "Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Innovations: Theory and Empirics," Discussion Paper Series 1504, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.4:y:2004:i:1:n:6. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Peter Golla (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.degruyter.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.