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Imaginary Risk, Public Health Regulation, and WTO Trade Dispute: A Rational Choice Perspective

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  • Ju Jinyul

    (Pusan National University)

Abstract

In this essay I seek answers to the following questions: why is it extremely difficult to resolve international trade disputes caused by domestic health risk regulation against a foreign food; why does the WTO legal system not work very well in solving the disputes; and what might be done to resolve the disputes properly, from a perspective of the rational choice model. I argue that it is irrational public fear which gave rise to decades-long, complex, and serious trade disputes. If the public are free from irrational fear, then there might be no pressure to impose an import ban and, consequently, no trade dispute and no non-compliance. Therefore an ultimate solution to trade conflict due to irrational fear should be sought in addressing imaginary risk directly. I suggest that the disputing parties provide consumers with information about their own welfare loss caused by the misguided import ban so that the public can make a rational decision on the imaginary risk problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Ju Jinyul, 2010. "Imaginary Risk, Public Health Regulation, and WTO Trade Dispute: A Rational Choice Perspective," Asian Journal of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-25, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ajlecn:v:1:y:2010:i:1:n:3
    DOI: 10.2202/2154-4611.1004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Scott, Joanne, 2009. "The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: A Commentary," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199563869.
    2. Keohane, Robert O, 2002. "Rational Choice Theory and International Law: Insights and Limitations," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 307-319, January.
    3. Frank H. Knight, 1950. "Economic and Social Policy in Democratic Society," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(6), pages 513-513.
    4. Thompson, Alexander, 2002. "Applying Rational Choice Theory to International Law: The Promise and Pitfalls," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 285-306, January.
    5. Posner, Richard A, 2002. "Some Economics of International Law: Comment on Conference Papers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 321-329, January.
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