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Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy

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  • Steve Werner
  • Henry L. Tosi
  • Luis Gomez‐Mejia

Abstract

This research investigated how the ownership structure is related to the firm's overall compensation strategy. The findings extend previous research that focused primarily on CEO compensation strategy. We show that there are significant differences in the compensation practices that apply to all employees as a function of the ownership structure. The results show that for owner‐controlled firms and owner‐managed firms there is significant pay/performance sensitivity for all employees. In management‐controlled firms, changes in pay are related to changes in size of the firm. These findings lead us to conclude that ownership structure not only affects upper management's pay, but also the pay of all employees through substantial differences in the firm's compensation practices. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Steve Werner & Henry L. Tosi & Luis Gomez‐Mejia, 2005. "Organizational governance and employee pay: how ownership structure affects the firm's compensation strategy," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(4), pages 377-384, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:stratm:v:26:y:2005:i:4:p:377-384
    DOI: 10.1002/smj.452
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    1. Ahmed A. Elamer & Collins G. Ntim & Hussein A. Abdou & Andrews Owusu & Mohamed Elmagrhi & Awad Elsayed Awad Ibrahim, 2021. "Are bank risk disclosures informative? Evidence from debt markets," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(1), pages 1270-1298, January.
    2. Alexandra Bertschi-Michel & Philipp Sieger & Thomas Wittig & Andreas Hack, 2023. "Sacrifice, Protect, and Hope for the Best: Family Ownership, Turnaround Moves, and Crisis Survival," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 47(4), pages 1132-1168, July.
    3. Palmberg, Johanna, 2012. "Family Control and Executive Compensation," Ratio Working Papers 186, The Ratio Institute.
    4. Jaufenthaler, Philipp, 2023. "A safe haven in times of crisis: The appeal of family companies as employers amid the COVID-19 pandemic," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 14(1).
    5. Yang, Chih-Hai, 2023. "Strengthening worker benefits or destroying jobs: Effect of the 2008 Labor Contract Law in China," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    6. Jörn H. Block & Christian O. Fisch & James Lau & Martin Obschonka & André Presse, 2019. "How Do Labor Market Institutions Influence the Preference to Work in Family Firms? A Multilevel Analysis Across 40 Countries," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 43(6), pages 1067-1093, November.
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    8. Anne Stevenot & Loris Guery & Geoffrey Wood & Chris Brewster, 2018. "Country of Origin Effects and New Financial Actors: Private Equity Investment and Work and Employment Practices of French Firms," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 56(4), pages 859-881, December.
    9. Walters, Bruce A. & Le, Son A. & Kroll, Mark, 2015. "Post-IPO governance and top management team rent generation and appropriation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 47-55.
    10. Baixauli-Soler, J. Samuel & Sanchez-Marin, Gregorio, 2011. "Organizational governance and TMT pay level adjustment," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(8), pages 862-870, August.
    11. Mirella Damiani & Fabrizio Pompei & Andrea Ricci, 2019. "The role of employee incentive pay in the competitiveness of family and non-family firms," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 36(3), pages 805-839, October.
    12. Redhwan Al‐Dhamari & Abdulsalam Saad Alquhaif & Bakr Ali Al‐Gamrh, 2022. "Modelling the impact of audit/remuneration committee overlap on debtholders' perceptions of accounting information quality: The role of CEO power," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(3), pages 2898-2920, July.
    13. Gregorio Sanchez-Marin & J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler & M. Encarnacion Lucas-Perez, 2010. "Ownership Structure and Board Effectiveness as Determinants of TMT Compensation in Spanish Listed Firms," Journal of Business Economics and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 92-109, November.
    14. Rebeca García-Ramos & Belén Díaz-Díaz & Myriam García-Olalla, 2017. "Independent directors, large shareholders and firm performance: the generational stage of family businesses and the socioemotional wealth approach," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 119-156, January.
    15. Chi, Wuchun & Liu, Chiawen & Wang, Taychang, 2009. "What affects accounting conservatism: A corporate governance perspective," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 47-59.
    16. Heinz, Matthias & Khashabi, Pooyan & Zubanov, Nick & Kretschmer, Tobias & Friebel, Guido, 2017. "Heterogeneous Effects of Performance Pay with Market Competition: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 12474, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. João Paulo Vieito & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão & Walayet A. Khan, 2009. "Executive Compensation: the Finance Perspective," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 3-32.
    18. Cristina Cersosimo, 2023. "The determinants of board size in Italian State-owned enterprises operating in water industry," DECISION: Official Journal of the Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, Springer;Indian Institute of Management Calcutta, vol. 50(2), pages 169-182, June.
    19. Peter Jaskiewicz & Joern H. Block & James G. Combs & Danny Miller, 2017. "The Effects of Founder and Family Ownership on Hired CEOs’ Incentives and Firm Performance," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 41(1), pages 73-103, January.
    20. Isabel‐María García‐Sánchez & Julia Martín‐Moreno & Sana Akbar Khan & Nazim Hussain, 2021. "Socio‐emotional wealth and corporate responses to environmental hostility: Are family firms more stakeholder oriented?," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 1003-1018, February.
    21. Mirella Damiani & Fabrizio Pompei & Andrea Ricci, 2016. "Competitiveness and performance related pay in family firms: the case of Italy," Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia, Finanza e Statistica 22/2016, Università di Perugia, Dipartimento Economia.
    22. Fernando Gómez-Bezares & Wojciech Przychodzen & Justyna Przychodzen, 2019. "Corporate Sustainability and CEO–Employee Pay Gap—Buster or Booster?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-15, October.
    23. J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler & M. Encarnacion Lucas-Perez & Juan Francisco Martin-Ugedo & Antonio Minguez-Vera & Gregorio Sanchez-Marin, 2016. "Executive directors' compensation and monitoring: the influence of gender diversity on Spanish boards," Journal of Business Economics and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(6), pages 1133-1154, November.

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