IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/pbudge/v36y2016i2p91-110.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Political Economy of Land Finance in China

Author

Listed:
  • Wen Wang
  • Fangzhi Ye

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Wen Wang & Fangzhi Ye, 2016. "The Political Economy of Land Finance in China," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 91-110, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:36:y:2016:i:2:p:91-110
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/pbaf.12086
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wu, Alfred M. & Wang, Wen, 2013. "Determinants of Expenditure Decentralization: Evidence from China," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 176-184.
    2. Huang, Yasheng, 1996. "Central-local relations in china during the reform era: The economic and institutional dimensions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 655-672, April.
    3. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    4. Peterson, George E., 2006. "Land leasing and land sale as an infrastructure-financing option," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4043, The World Bank.
    5. Nancy H. Chau & Weiwen Zhang, 2011. "Harnessing the Forces of Urban Expansion: The Public Economics of Farmland Development Allowances," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 87(3), pages 488-507.
    6. Guangzhong Cao & Changchun Feng & Ran Tao, 2008. "Local “Land Finance” in China's Urban Expansion: Challenges and Solutions," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 16(2), pages 19-30, March.
    7. Jieming Zhu, 2005. "A Transitional Institution for the Emerging Land Market in Urban China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 42(8), pages 1369-1390, July.
    8. Chenggang Xu, 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1076-1151, December.
    9. Fubing Su & Ran Tao & Lu Xi & Ming Li, 2012. "Local Officials' Incentives and China's Economic Growth: Tournament Thesis Reexamined and Alternative Explanatory Framework," China & World Economy, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, vol. 20(4), pages 1-18, July.
    10. Heller, Peter S, 1975. "A Model of Public Fiscal Behavior in Developing Countries: Aid, Investment, and Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 429-445, June.
    11. Sheng,Yumin, 2010. "Economic Openness and Territorial Politics in China," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521195386.
    12. Li, Hongbin & Zhou, Li-An, 2005. "Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1743-1762, September.
    13. De Wang & Li Zhang & Zhao Zhang & Simon Xiaobin Zhao, 2011. "Urban Infrastructure Financing in Reform-era China," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 48(14), pages 2975-2998, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Nannan, 2019. "What gave rise to China’s land finance?," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    2. Chunhui Liu & Weixuan Song & Chen Zhou, 2017. "Unsuccessful Urban Governance of Brownfield Land Redevelopment: A Lesson from the Toxic Soil Event in Changzhou, China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 9(5), pages 1-14, May.
    3. Jinsong Wang & Wenhui Wu & Yueqiao Li & Qiyuan Yang, 2023. "The Impacts of Land and Real Estate Price Fluctuations on Financial Stability: Evidence from China," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 56(1), pages 42-60, March.
    4. Wang, Di & Ren, Cairu & Zhou, Tao, 2021. "Understanding the impact of land finance on industrial structure change in China: Insights from a spatial econometric analysis," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    5. Wang, Jian & Wu, Qun & Yan, Siqi & Guo, Guancheng & Peng, Shangui, 2020. "China’s local governments breaking the land use planning quota: A strategic interaction perspective," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    6. Tang, Peng & Feng, Yue & Li, Min & Zhang, Yanyan, 2021. "Can the performance evaluation change from central government suppress illegal land use in local governments? A new interpretation of Chinese decentralisation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    7. Li, Lei & Ma, Shaojun & Zheng, Yilin & Xiao, Xinyue, 2022. "Integrated regional development: Comparison of urban agglomeration policies in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    8. Xinhai Lu & Mingxu Bai & Bing Kuang & Danling Chen, 2021. "Unlocking the Relationship between Land Finance and Regional Integration," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-17, August.
    9. Ya Zhao & Lennon H. T. Choy & Kwong Wing Chau, 2023. "Political Circles and Land Supply for the Service and Industrial Sectors: Evidence from 284 Cities in China," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(3), pages 1-16, February.
    10. Xiaotong Li & Ying Li & Jinlan Ni & Jia Yuan, 2022. "Master development, land appreciation, and government finance: Evidence from the Disney project in Shanghai," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(4), pages 1027-1046, August.
    11. Wang, Weifang & van Noorloos, Femke & Spit, Tejo, 2020. "Stakeholder power relations in Land Value Capture: comparing public (China) and private (U.S.) dominant regimes," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    12. Lan, Jing & Li, Qiuming & Zheng, Yuqing & Liu, Zhen, 2023. "The impact of the Low-Carbon City Pilots programme on industrial land transfer by local governments in China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 824-842.
    13. Yubo Wang & Xizhu Yang, 2022. "Fiscal Ecological Cost of Land in China: Estimation and Regional Differences," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(8), pages 1-25, August.
    14. Zhao, Renjie & Chen, Jie & Feng, Chen & Zhong, Shihu, 2020. "The impact of anti-corruption measures on land supply and the associated implications: The case of China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    15. Chen, Jie & Wu, Fulong, 2022. "Housing and land financialization under the state ownership of land in China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 112(C).
    16. Tang, Peng & Shi, Xiaoping & Gao, Jinlong & Feng, Shuyi & Qu, Futian, 2019. "Demystifying the key for intoxicating land finance in China: An empirical study through the lens of government expenditure," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 302-309.
    17. He Zhu & Xing Gao & Ying Lin & Yijing He, 2022. "Land-Development-Right Pricing Based on Spatial Characteristics in Urban Local Function Regeneration," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(12), pages 1-25, November.
    18. jiali, Wan & yanfang, Liu & xiaoling, Zhang, 2021. "Conflict in informal rural construction land transfer practices in China: A case of Hubei," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    19. Huasheng Song & Guili Sun, 2022. "Investment Promotion, Tax Competition, and Industrial Land Price in China—Evidence from the Corporate Tax Collection Reform," Land, MDPI, vol. 11(5), pages 1-17, May.
    20. Xinhua Zhu & Yigang Wei & Yani Lai & Yan Li & Sujuan Zhong & Chun Dai, 2019. "Empirical Analysis of the Driving Factors of China’s ‘Land Finance’ Mechanism Using Soft Budget Constraint Theory and the PLS-SEM Model," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(3), pages 1-21, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jing Wu & Hao Li & Keyang Li, 2020. "Local political chief turnover and economic growth: Evidence from China," Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(3), pages 441-466, July.
    2. Wang, Li & Menkhoff, Lukas & Schröder, Michael & Xu, Xian, 2019. "Politicians’ promotion incentives and bank risk exposure in China," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 63-94.
    3. Wang, Yuan & Hui, Eddie Chi-man, 2017. "Are local governments maximizing land revenue? Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 196-215.
    4. Jackie Zheng Yan & Sea‐Jin Chang, 2018. "The contingent effects of political strategies on firm performance: A political network perspective," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(8), pages 2152-2177, August.
    5. Chen, Xiude & Qin, Quande & Wei, Y.-M., 2016. "Energy productivity and Chinese local officials’ promotions: Evidence from provincial governors," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 103-112.
    6. Ding, Chengri & Niu, Yi & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2014. "Spending preferences of local officials with off-budget land revenues of Chinese cities," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 265-276.
    7. Tao Chen & Youchao Tan & Jinghua Wang & Cheng (Colin) Zeng, 2022. "The Unintended Consequence of Land Finance: Evidence from Corporate Tax Avoidance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(11), pages 8319-8342, November.
    8. Gyourko, Joseph & Shen, Yang & Wu, Jing & Zhang, Rongjie, 2022. "Land finance in China: Analysis and review," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    9. Changlin Luo, 2019. "The Transition of Local Government Financing Platforms in China: Risks, Incentives, and Regulations," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 20(1), pages 221-245, May.
    10. Jianing Zang & Liangliang Liu, 2020. "Fiscal decentralization, government environmental preference, and regional environmental governance efficiency: evidence from China," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 65(2), pages 439-457, October.
    11. Huang, Zhonghua & Du, Xuejun, 2018. "Holding the market under the stimulus plan: Local government financing vehicles' land purchasing behavior in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 85-100.
    12. Julan Du & Hongsheng Fang & Xiangrong Jin, 2013. "Chinese Political and Economic Governance System and the Imbalance between Consumption and Investment," Working Papers 232013, Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research.
    13. Chen, Ting & Kung, J.K.-S., 2016. "Do land revenue windfalls create a political resource curse? Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 86-106.
    14. Yang Shen & Jing Wu & Shuping Wu, 2022. "City‐chief turnover and place‐based policy change: Evidence from China," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(5), pages 1296-1328, November.
    15. Du, Julan & Fang, Hongsheng & Jin, Xiangrong, 2014. "The “growth-first strategy” and the imbalance between consumption and investment in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 441-458.
    16. Cao, Chunfang & Li, Xiaoyang & Xia, Changyuan, 2021. "The complicit role of local government authorities in corporate bribery: Evidence from a tax collection reform in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    17. Wang, He & Yao, Yang & Zhou, Yue, 2022. "Markets price politicians: Evidence from China’s municipal bond markets," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    18. Ma, Ben & Zheng, Xinye, 2018. "Biased data revisions: Unintended consequences of China's energy-saving mandates," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 102-113.
    19. Zhang, Muyang & Zhou, Guangsu & Fan, Gang, 2020. "Political Control and Economic Inequality: Evidence from Chinese Cities," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    20. Zhao, Da & Yu, Ao & Guo, Jingyuan, 2022. "Judicial institutions, local protection and market segmentation: Evidence from the establishment of interprovincial circuit tribunals in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:pbudge:v:36:y:2016:i:2:p:91-110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0275-1100 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.