This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

How Target Shareholders Benefit from Value-Reducing Defensive Strategies in Takeovers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Berkovitch, Elazar
Khanna, Naveen
Abstract

This paper shows that target shareholders can be made better-off through the use of certain types of defensive strategies that reduce the value of the target by different amounts for different bidders. In many cases, simply the threat of such strategies can make target shareholders better-off. Therefore, empirical tests based on stock price reactions at the adoption of defensive strategies may be underestimating the effect of such strategies. The paper also identifies the necessary characteristics that make these strategies effective and shows that many observed defenses possess similar properties. Copyright 1990 by American Finance Association.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1082%28199003%2945%3A1%3C137%3AHTSBFV%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.

Volume (Year): 45 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 137-56
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:45:y:1990:i:1:p:137-56

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.afajof.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.afajof.org/membership/join.asp

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. James M. Mahoney & Chamu Sundaramurthy & Joseph T. Mahoney, 1995. "The differential impact on stockholder wealth of various antitakeover provisions," Research Paper 9512, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Utz Weitzel, 2005. "Bargaining in Mergers: The Role of Outside Options and Termination Provisions," Working Papers 05-32, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz, 2007. "Bargaining in Mergers and Termination Fees," CEPR Discussion Papers 6210, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, 2003. "Bidder Asymmetry in Takeover Contests: The Role of Deal Protection Devices," Finance 0311011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 750 journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-11-26.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.