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Monitoring In Teams: Using Laboratory Experiments To Study A Theory Of The Firm

Author

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  • Stefan Grosse
  • Louis Putterman
  • Bettina Rockenbach

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Grosse & Louis Putterman & Bettina Rockenbach, 2011. "Monitoring In Teams: Using Laboratory Experiments To Study A Theory Of The Firm," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(4), pages 785-816, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jeurec:v:9:y:2011:i:4:p:785-816
    DOI: j.1542-4774.2011.01026.x
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Björn Bartling & Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2012. "Use and abuse of authority: A behavioral foundation of the employment relation," ECON - Working Papers 098, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Bartling, Björn & Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2012. "Use and Abuse of Authority," Discussion Papers in Economics 14243, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    3. Sääksvuori, Lauri, 2013. "Voluntary formation of centralized sanctioning institutions," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 150-159.
    4. Corgnet, Brice & Martin, Ludivine & Ndodjang, Peguy & Sutan, Angela, 2019. "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 23-45.
    5. Nicklisch, Andreas & Grechenig, Kristoffel & Thöni, Christian, 2016. "Information-sensitive Leviathans," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1-13.
    6. Albanese, Marina & Navarra, Cecilia & Tortia, Ermanno C., 2015. "Employer moral hazard and wage rigidity. The case of worker owned and investor owned firms," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 227-237.
    7. Loukas Dalafoutas & Martin G. Kocher & Louis Putterman & Matthias Sutter, 2010. "Equality, Equity and Incentives: An Experiment," Working Papers 2010-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    8. Silvia Angerer & Daniela Glätzle-Rützler & ChristianWaibel, 2020. "Monitoring institutions in health care markets: Experimental evidence," Working Papers 2020-32, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    9. Balafoutas, Loukas & Kocher, Martin G. & Putterman, Louis & Sutter, Matthias, 2013. "Equality, equity and incentives: An experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 32-51.
    10. Brandts, Jordi & Corgnet, Brice & Hernán-González, Roberto & Ortiz, José Mª & Solà, Carles, 2021. "Watching or not watching? Access to information and the incentive effects of firing threats," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 189(C), pages 672-685.
    11. Leila Agha & Keith Marzilli Ericson & Kimberley H. Geissler & James B. Rebitzer, 2022. "Team Relationships and Performance: Evidence from Healthcare Referral Networks," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(5), pages 3735-3754, May.
    12. Drouvelis, Michalis & Nosenzo, Daniele & Sefton, Martin, 2017. "Team incentives and leadership," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 173-185.
    13. DeAngelo, Gregory & Gee, Laura Katherine, 2018. "Peers or Police? Detection and Sanctions in the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 11540, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Wang, Jianwei & Yu, Fengyuan & He, Jialu & Chen, Wei & Xu, Wenshu & Dai, Wenhui & Ming, Yuexin, 2023. "Promotion, Disintegration and Remediation of group cooperation under heterogeneous distribution system based on peer rating," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 168(C).
    15. Jeffrey Carpenter & Andrea Robbett & Prottoy A. Akbar, 2018. "Profit Sharing and Peer Reporting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4261-4276, September.
    16. H. Frech & Christopher Whaley & Benjamin Handel & Liora Bowers & Carol Simon & Richard Scheffler, 2015. "Market Power, Transactions Costs, and the Entry of Accountable Care Organizations in Health Care," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(2), pages 167-193, September.
    17. Kamei, Kenju & Tabero, Katy, 2021. "The Individual-Team Discontinuity Effect on Institutional Choices: Experimental Evidence in Voluntary Public Goods Provision," MPRA Paper 112106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Luke Boosey & R. Mark Isaac & Abhijit Ramalingam, 2021. "Limiting the Leader: Fairness Concerns in Team Production with Leader-Determined Monitoring," Working Papers 21-11, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    19. Leila Agha & Keith Marzilli Ericson & Kimberley H. Geissler & James B. Rebitzer, 2018. "Team Formation and Performance: Evidence from Healthcare Referral Networks," NBER Working Papers 24338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Brice Corgnet & Ludivine Martin & Peguy Ndodjang & Angela Sutan, 2015. "On the Merit of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact with Incentive Setting," Working Papers 15-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    21. Nicklisch, Andreas & Putterman, Louis & Thöni, Christian, 2021. "Trigger-happy or precisionist? On demand for monitoring in peer-based public goods provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

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