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The influence of fiscal rules on healthcare policy in the United States and the Netherlands

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  • H. Christiaan Schakel
  • Patrick Jeurissen
  • Sherry Glied

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  • H. Christiaan Schakel & Patrick Jeurissen & Sherry Glied, 2017. "The influence of fiscal rules on healthcare policy in the United States and the Netherlands," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(4), pages 595-607, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:ijhplm:v:32:y:2017:i:4:p:595-607
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/hpm.2382
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Wyplosz, Charles, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191, pages 64-78, January.
    2. Jürgen von Hagen, 2002. "Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(3), pages 263-284.
    3. White, Joseph, 2013. "Budget-makers and health care systems," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 112(3), pages 163-171.
    4. George A. Krause & James W. Douglas, 2006. "Does agency competition improve the quality of policy analysis? Evidence from OMB and CBO fiscal projections," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(1), pages 53-74.
    5. Allen Schick, 2003. "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 3(3), pages 7-34.
    6. Mr. George Kopits, 2001. "Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament?," IMF Working Papers 2001/145, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Charles Wyplosz, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191(1), pages 64-78, January.
    8. Joseph White, 2015. "What are budgeting's purposes?: Comments on OECD's principles of good budgetary governance," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 14(3), pages 1-18.
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    Cited by:

    1. Braendle, Thomas & Colombier, Carsten, 2020. "Budgetary targets as cost-containment measure in the Swiss healthcare system? Lessons from abroad," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 124(6), pages 605-614.

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