The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision‐Making Process
AbstractIn this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence a public decision maker â and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task â with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Economics & Politics.
Volume (Year): 24 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0954-1985
Other versions of this item:
- Giuseppe Albanese & Marco M. Sorge, 2010. "The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H49 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2003.
"Judicial Checks and Balances,"
NBER Working Papers
9775, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anne van Aaken & Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2008.
"Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2245, CESifo Group Munich.
- Anne van Aaken & Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2008. "Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200801, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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