Previous papers modelling the interaction between the central bank and a single monopoly union demonstrated that greater monetary policy uncertainty reduces the union's nominal wage. This paper shows that this result does not hold in general, since it depends on peculiar specifications of the union's objective function. In particular, I show that greater monetary policy uncertainty raises the nominal wage whenever union members tend to be more sensitive to the risk of getting low real wages than to the risk of remaining unemployed. This conclusion appears consistent with the evidence showing that greater monetary authority's transparency reduces average inflation. Copyright 2007 The Author Journal compilation 2007 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA
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Article provided by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA in its journal Economic Notes.
Volume (Year): 36 (2007) Issue (Month): 3 (November) Pages: 247-258 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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