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Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: do too many cooks spoil the goulash?

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Author Info
John S. Earle (Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Central European University.)
Csaba Kucsera (Loránd Eötvös University)
Álmos Telegdy (CEU and the Economics Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.)

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Abstract

We examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance using panel data for firms listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange, where ownership tends to be highly concentrated and frequently involves multiple blocks. Fixed-effects estimates imply that the size of the largest block increases profitability and efficiency strongly and monotonically, but the effects of total blockholdings are much smaller and statistically insignificant. Controlling for the size of the largest block, point estimates of the marginal effects of additional blocks are negative. The results suggest that the marginal costs of concentration may outweigh the benefits when the increased concentration involves "too many cooks". Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.

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File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00420.x
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Corporate Governance: An International Review.

Volume (Year): 13 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
Pages: 254-264
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Handle: RePEc:bla:corgov:v:13:y:2005:i:2:p:254-264

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0964-8410&site=1

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Clifford G. Holderness, 2003. "A survey of blockholders and corporate control," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 51-64. [Downloadable!]
  2. Armo Gomes & Walter Novaes, 2001. "Sharing of Control as a Corporate Governance Mechanism," Penn CARESS Working Papers 3756d78204ca49d92aaf1c17c, Penn Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  3. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov & Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, 2002. "Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2741-2771, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1993. "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 678-709, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Patrick BOLTON & Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1996. "Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 9619, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
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  8. Albert S. Kyle & Jean-Luc Vila, 1991. "Noise Trading and Takeovers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 54-71, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Martin Hovey & Larry Li & Tony Naughton, 2003. "The Relationship Between Valuation and Ownership of Listed Firms in China," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 112-122, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Stijn Claessens & Simeon Djankov, 1999. "Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 227, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1988. "The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations : An exploratory analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 317-346, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Bennedsen, Morten & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2000. "The balance of power in closely held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 113-139. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank A., 2000. "Universal banking and the performance of German firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 29-80. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Burkart, Mike & Gromb, Denis & Panunzi, Fausto, 1997. "Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 693-728, August.
  15. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Zsolt Bedo & Eva Ozsvald, 2008. "Codes of Good Governance in Hungary," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0818, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  2. J. David Brown & John S. Earle & Almos Telegdy, 2005. "The Productivity Effects of Privatization: Longitudinal Estimates from Hungary, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine," Staff Working Papers 05-121, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. John S. Earle & Álmos Telegdy, 2007. "Ownership and Wages: Estimating Public-Private and Foreign-Domestic Differentials Using LEED from Hungary, 1986-2003," IZA Discussion Papers 3125, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. John S. Earle & Almos Telegdy, 2007. "Ownership and Wages: Estimating Public-Private and Foreign-Domestic Differentials with LEED from Hungary, 1986–2003," Staff Working Papers 07-134, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2006. "Control consolidation with a threshold: An algorithm," Working Papers CEB 06-007.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Ariane Chapelle & Ariane Szafarz, 2005. "Controlling Firms through the Majority Voting Rule," Working Papers DULBEA 05-05.RS, Université libre de Bruxelles, Department of Applied Economics (DULBEA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Marko Simoneti & Joze P. Damijan & Matija Rojec & Boris Majcen, 2004. "Case-by-case versus Mass Privatization in Transition Economies: Owner and Seller Effects on Performance of Firms in Slovenia," LICOS Discussion Papers 14304, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, K.U.Leuven. [Downloadable!]
  8. Joze P. Damiajn & Aleksandra Grogoric & Janez Prasnikar, 2004. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in Slovenia," LICOS Discussion Papers 14204, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, K.U.Leuven. [Downloadable!]
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