Property Rights, Regulatory Taking, And Compensation: Implications For Environmental Protection
AbstractThe 104th Congress considered several proposals requiring compensation for regulatory actions that diminish property values. Aimed primarily at weakening environmental protection, the bills focus on property rights independent of the public benefits from regulation. By significantly broadening the constitutional standard for compensation, the bills generate a government liability well in excess of compliance costs and thus discourage regulatory agencies from carrying out their mandates. The bills would increase transactions costs and undermine the efficient provision of environmental quality, public safety, and other public goods. Copyright 1997 Western Economic Association International.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Contemporary Economic Policy.
Volume (Year): 15 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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- Goldstein, Jon H., 0. "Whose Land Is It Anyway? Endangered Species, Private Property, And The Fight For The Environment," Increasing Understanding of Public Problems and Policies, Farm Foundation.
- Robert M. Hunt & Tim VandenBerg, 1998. "Discouraging Federal actions that reduce the value of private property: evaluating procedural and financial approaches," Working Papers 98-24, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2011. "Regulatory Takings," Working papers 2011-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Infanger, Craig L., 1996. "Environmental Regulatory Reform And The Unholy Trinity: Unfunded Mandates, Risk Assessment, And Property Rights," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 28(01), July.
- Adanu, Kwami & Hoehn, John P. & Norris, Patricia & Iglesias, Emma, 2012. "Voter decisions on eminent domain and police power reforms," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 187-194.
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