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Political, Ideological and Economic Determinants of Abortion Position: An Empirical Analysis of Stale Legislatures and Governors

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  • Leo H. Kahane

Abstract

. The Supreme Court's decisions in the 1989 Webster and 1992 Casey cases shifted the focus of abortion legislation from the federal to the state level. In light of this shift, the factors that affect the position taken by state level office holders on abortion is examined using state level data. Results of a probit analysis show that a governor's position on abortion is significantly influenced by the governor's ideology as well as the abortion demand of his or her constituency. Similar probit analyses for state senates and stale houses shows that a constituency's abortion demand as well as factors representing the constituency's demand for access to legal abortion services significantly affect the position both legislative bodies take on abortion. Policy maker's ideology is found to play a significant role in shaping state senates’ position on abortion, but not the positions of state houses’. This last result is consistent with the proposition that policy makers who have a narrow constituency, such as state house members, have less freedom to make decisions based on their own ideology and are more beholden to the views of their constituency, all else equal.

Suggested Citation

  • Leo H. Kahane, 1994. "Political, Ideological and Economic Determinants of Abortion Position: An Empirical Analysis of Stale Legislatures and Governors," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 347-359, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:53:y:1994:i:3:p:347-359
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1994.tb02604.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kau, James B & Rubin, Paul H, 1979. "Self-Interest, Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 365-384, October.
    2. Conway, Karen Smith & Butler, Michael R, 1992. "State Abortion Legislation as a Public Good--Before and after Roe v. Wade," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 30(4), pages 609-626, October.
    3. Marshall Medoff, 1989. "Constituencies, ideology, and the demand for abortion legislation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 185-191, February.
    4. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    5. Medoff, Marshall H, 1988. "An Economic Analysis of the Demand for Abortions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(2), pages 353-359, April.
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