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Covid, central banks and the bank-sovereign nexus

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  • Bryan Hardy
  • Sonya Zhu

Abstract

The Covid–19 outbreak strongly affected the evolution of the bank–sovereign nexus. In advanced economies, banks played an important role in financing sovereign debt during the first two quarters of 2020 but their participation fell in subsequent quarters. Correspondingly, the share of sovereign debt in banks' portfolios declined. In contrast, central bank reserves soared due to asset purchase and funding–for–lending programmes. In emerging market economies, the rise in banks' holdings of sovereign debt started before the Covid–19 outbreak and accelerated thereafter. From a longer–term perspective, the perceived credit risk of banks tends to co–move more strongly with that of sovereigns when the share of sovereign debt on banks' balance sheets is higher or – keeping this share constant – when the share of reserves is lower

Suggested Citation

  • Bryan Hardy & Sonya Zhu, 2023. "Covid, central banks and the bank-sovereign nexus," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:bis:bisqtr:2303h
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Pablo Garcia Luna & Bryan Hardy, 2019. "Non-bank counterparties in international banking," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lewis, Karen K. & Fang, Xiang & Hardy, Bryan, 2022. "Who Holds Sovereign Debt and Why It Matters," CEPR Discussion Papers 17338, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Yusuf Soner Baskaya & Bryan Hardy & Ṣebnem Kalemli-Özcan & Vivian Yue, 2016. "Sovereign Risk and Bank Lending: Evidence from 1999 Turkish Earthquake," NBER Working Papers 22335, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Julián Caballero & Alexis Maurin & Philip Wooldridge & Dora Xia, 2023. "Interest rate risk management by EME banks," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, September.
    4. Claudio Borio & Marc Farag & Fabrizio Zampolli, 2023. "Tackling the fiscal policy-financial stability nexus," BIS Working Papers 1090, Bank for International Settlements.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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